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Abstract
This paper contributes to the debate about the optimal design of tax-transfer
systems. Based on the theory of optimal taxation, combined with microsimu-
lation and microeconometric techniques we derive the welfare function which
makes the current German tax and transfer system for single women optimal.
Furthermore, we compare the welfare function conditional on the presence and
age of children and asses how reforms of in-kind childcare transfers would aﬀect
the welfare function. This analysis allows us to derive conclusions about the
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This paper contributes to the debate about the optimal design of tax-transfer systems
with a speciﬁc focus on cash and in-kind beneﬁts for single parents with children. In
most developed countries, governments channel a large share of their overall transfers
towards households with children. However, the design of these child related trans-
fers strongly diﬀers between countries. Transfers range from child beneﬁts, child tax
allowances, generous out-of-work transfers for families with children, in-work trans-
fers conditional on children, to subsidies - in-kind or cash - for childcare. In general,
transfers generate equity for a society through redistribution of income, yet lead to
ineﬃciencies through distortions. This describes the well known trade-oﬀ between eq-
uity and eﬃciency of income taxation and transfers.1 The degree of equality induced
by child related transfers and the associate distortions depend on the design of the
country speciﬁc transfer programs. Whereas in several countries child transfers are
seen as general support for families with children and as a way to alleviate poverty and
increase equity, in other countries a large share of the transfers for households with
children is conditioned on employment of the parents. A central purpose of the latter
class of transfers is to increase eﬃciency by fostering employment of parents, in par-
ticular mothers who have in general a very low employment rate. These diﬀerences in
the design of transfers highlight the general dilemma of public transfers. Means tested
transfers for households with children unconditional on the employment status reduce
inequality in a society by reducing poverty. However, on the other hand transfers
unconditional on employment reduce work incentives, and thus lead to ineﬃciencies.
Transfers conditional on employment have by deﬁnition a positive eﬀect on eﬃciency
in terms of employment, yet have no eﬀect on the poverty of needy families who are
out of work. Thus, the optimal design of the tax-transfer system depends on a society’s
preferences for equity and eﬃciency.
The central purpose of this paper is to empirically asses the optimal design of tax-
transfer systems for single households with children in Germany. In particular, we will
not only take cash transfers targeted at families with children, but also in-kind beneﬁts
into account. This is important since in Germany, child related in-kind transfers, that
1Note, in this paper we deﬁne eﬃciency only in terms of employment. Eﬃciency e.g. in terms of
child rearing cannot be discussed in the proposed framework.
1is transfer which are channeled directly to institutions and not to households, make up
a large share of resources allocated towards families with children.
The starting point of our analysis are two observations. First, child related in-
kind as well as cash beneﬁts strongly depend on the age of the children. Thus, it
seems that the society weights the equity-eﬃciency trade-oﬀ diﬀerently for families
with children of diﬀerent age groups. For example, in Germany single mothers with
very young children are generally not expected to participate in the labor market and if,
only for few hours, and are thus provided with relatively higher out-of-work transfers.
Obviously, for this group, society is more concerned about equity than eﬃciency in
terms of employment. Second, the design of in-kind beneﬁts in terms of subsidized
childcare are currently under rigorous reform in Germany. While subsidized childcare
for children younger than three years has hardly been available in the past decades,
at least in West Germany, recently several reforms have been introduced that aim
at increasing childcare for this group of children conditional on employment of their
parents.
The optimal design of transfer programs, and the trade-oﬀ between equity and
eﬃciency has been intensively analyzed in the economic literature. The seminal theo-
retical contribution is Mirrlees (1971) which has been extended in several dimensions
over the last decades. The theoretical extension which is central for this analysis is
Saez (2002), who proposed a discrete model of optimal taxation where individuals can
adjust their labor supply behavior along the extensive (participation) and the inten-
sive (working hours) margin. The empirical literature on the optimality of taxation
and transfers is still scarce, recent examples based on microsimulation techniques are
Immervoll et al. (2007) and Bourguignon and Spadaro (2005). Blundell et al. (2007)
combine microsimulation and microeconometric techniques and apply the theoretical
model of optimal taxation of Saez (2002) to discuss the transfer system towards lone
mothers in Germany and the UK.2
We apply the same empirical method as in Blundell et al. to discuss the optimal
design of income taxation and transfers for single women conditional on children and
2There exists several empirical studies on welfare eﬀects of tax reforms (e.g. Aarberge and
Columbino (2005)). However these studies diﬀer from the models closely linked to the optimal income
tax theory as they are not derived from an optimal tax formula but rather from structural econometric
models of labor supply behavior.
2the age of children in Germany. We focus on single women for a number of reasons.
First, lone mothers are eligible for generous transfer programmes, and the interaction of
transfer programmes and the income tax system can generate budget constraints with
high and variable eﬀective marginal tax rates. Second, there is a (partly emotional)
debate about the extent to which lone mothers should be supported by the state, even
when they do not work, and about the support singles without children should receive
from the government. This is in particular true for lone parents with pre-school age
children. Moreover, in practical terms, focusing on lone adult households allows us to
avoid the substantial complexity to both, models of labor supply, as well as optimal tax
theory that arise when dealing with household decisions of labor supply. We extend
the paper of Blundell et al. (2007) by comparing the optimal design conditional on the
age of children and by explicitly accounting for in-kind subsidies of childcare.
In this paper, we do not derive an optimal tax schedule based on some normative
assumption about the welfare function of a society. Instead, we follow the idea of Bour-
guignon and Spadaro (2005) and derive the welfare function of the society which makes
the current German tax and transfer system of single women optimal. Furthermore,
we compare the welfare function of the society conditional on the presence and age
of children and asses how the reform of in-kind childcare subsidies aﬀects the welfare
function.
2 Institutional Background
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview about the German tax and beneﬁt
system with a particular focus on transfers and taxation of households with children.
Moreover, we discuss the work incentives the current design of the tax and transfer
system induces.
2.1 Main characteristics of the German tax-transfer system
The main characteristics of the German tax-transfer system are a progressive income
tax schedule with a basic allowance of 7,664.3 Additionally, there exist child allowances
amounting to 2,924 Euro per year per child. Married spouses can ﬁle jointly and make
3All numbers are for the ﬁscal year 2005.
3use of full income splitting. Single parents can draw an additional single parents’ tax
allowance amounting to 1,208 Euro per year.
The most important cash transfer for families with dependent children in Germany
is the child beneﬁt (“Kindergeld”) that amounts to about 150 Euro per month per child
and is granted regardless of the family’s income. For children younger than 3 years,
there is an additional child rearing beneﬁt (“Erziehungsgeld”) of 300 Euro per month
that can be drawn for a maximum period of 24 months. This beneﬁt is means-tested
and is only granted if one of the parents is on parental leave, i.e. not working more
than 30 hours per week. The income thresholds up to which this beneﬁt is granted
diﬀer by age of the child and amount to about 30,000 Euro in the ﬁrst six months after
childbirth and are reduced to about 16,500 Euro per year for children aged between 7
and 24 months. Above these income thresholds, the beneﬁt is withdrawn at a rate of
62 percent based on household income.4
Besides these family related beneﬁts, Germany has a quite generous system of out-
of-work beneﬁts. Unemployed individuals who are eligible for unemployment beneﬁts
within the social security system receive about 65% of their net earnings for several
months, depending on their age and the time they have been contributing to the social
security system. People who do not have claims to unemployment beneﬁts receive
social assistance. Social assistance has been rigorously reformed in 2005. Before this
reform, there were two diﬀerent beneﬁts. Long-term unemployed persons who were
eligible for transfers from the unemployment insurance were granted a transfer called
“Arbeitslosenhilfe” that amounted to 53% of their net earnings prior unemployment.
Persons who were not eligible to this transfer got “Sozialhilfe” which consisted of a
basic transfer amounting to about 300 Euro per month with additional transfers for
children, single parents etc. Costs for housing were paid extra, depending on the size
of the household. In 2005, the two transfers “Arbeitslosenhilfe” and “Sozialhilfe” were
combined into one transfer scheme called “Arbeitslosengeld II” that does not depend
on previous earnings. This transfer now consists of a basic allowance of about 350
4In January 2007 the child rearing beneﬁt was replaced by a new scheme of parental leave beneﬁts
called “Elterngeld”. This new beneﬁt is not means-tested but rather related to pre-birth earnings of
the parent who is on parental leave. Parents who have not been working prior to the birth of their
child receive a minimum amount of 300 Euro per month. The means test has been abolished, however
the maximum duration period has been reduced to 14 months. For more details on this reform, see
Spiess and Wrohlich (2008).
4Euro per month. It is topped up by allowances for children, other family members as
well as housing costs depending on household size. Single parents get an additional
allowance. For a single mother with a child under 14 years these beneﬁts add up to 676
Euro per month plus housing costs amounting to 350 Euro on average. Note that the
child beneﬁt is not added up to social assistance but counted as income that is fully
withdrawn. In contrast, the child rearing beneﬁt is granted on top of social assistance.
Once recipients of “Arbeitslosengeld II” start working, the transfer is withdrawn at a
rate of 70-85 % depending on the amount of wage income.
In contrast to countries such as the UK or the US, the tax and transfer system
in Germany does not include large transfer programs which are conditional on em-
ployment, such as the Working Tax Credit (WTC) or the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). The only exception is the “Kinderzuschlag” which is a small transfer pro-
gram for families with dependent children called. The scheme is targeted to families
who have enough earnings such that the minimum subsistence level – deﬁned by the
amount of the “Arbeitslosengeld II” transfer – is met for the parents, however, not
for the children. These families receive a transfer of 140 Euro per month per child
that is withdrawn at a rate of 70%. The scheme is not very generous in terms of the
number of recipients, since the income range of eligibility for this transfer is very small.
Moreover, single mothers receiving maintenance payments for their children by the
children’s father are not eligible to this transfer. This is because the “Kinderzuschlag”
is fully withdrawn if the child has income on his own, and maintenance payments are
considered as income of the child.
The described design of the current German tax and transfer system does not lead
to strictly deﬁned “in-work credits” characterized by negative marginal tax rates as
present e.g. in the US system. Hence, in Germany overall transfers in-work are strictly
lower than transfers out-of-work. In this respect the German system has the optimal
design according the theoretical model of Mirrlees.
2.2 Childcare institutions
Subsidies for childcare in Germany are mostly granted directly to childcare centers
rather than to parents. Hence, these transfers can be characterized as in-kind transfers
5rather than direct cash transfers to the households. 5 Childcare centers are either run
by local authorities such as the communities or by private, mostly non-proﬁt institu-
tions such as churches or other associations who all receive subsidies. The parents’ fees
that are charged by childcare centers are income-dependent and make up 30 percent
of total costs at most. On average, the parents fees amount to about 70 Euro per
month for a part-time slot and 110 Euro per month for a full-time slot. While on the
one hand parents’ fees for subsidized childcare are relatively low compared to other
European countries (see e.g. Immervoll and Barber (2005)), availability of childcare is
limited, in particular for children under three years living in West Germany. The aver-
age availability rate of childcare slots for this group of children amounted to 3 percent
in 2002. East Germany, however, has high availability ratios amounting to 37 percent
on average (see Wrohlich (2007a) for more details on the availability of childcare by
age group and diﬀerent regions in Germany).
Previous empirical studies have shown that there is a considerable excess demand
for subsidized childcare slots, in particular for children under three years. More than
a third of all children under three years do not have access to a childcare slot although
their parents demand one Wrohlich (2007b). These families thus have to rely on pri-
vately organized childcare that comes at markedly higher costs. On average, privately
organized full-time care costs about 860 Euro per month, part-time care about 430
Euro per month. Based on this information, a sort of “expected” costs (ec) of child-
care can be computed. These costs consist of a weighted average of the subsidized
parents’ fees (cs) and the private costs (cm), where the weights are calculated on the
basis of the probability (π) that a child does not have access to subsidized childcare
(see Wrohlich (2007a) for more details):
ec = c
s · (1 − π) + c
m · (π) (1)
The individual rationing probability π is estimated on the basis of a partial ob-
servability model of demand and supply of subsidized childcare such as suggested in
Wrohlich (2007b). Averages of these probabilities are reported in Table 1 for children
5The only exception is that childcare costs can be deducted from taxable income up to a maximum
amount of 1,500 Euro per year per child. From January 2007 on, the possibility to deduct childcare
costs from taxable income has been formulated more generously. The amount of deductable expenses
has been increased up to 4,000 Euro per year per child.
6of three diﬀerent age groups. Rationing is highest for children in the youngest age
group and it is also relatively high for school children who need afternoon care in the
case that their mothers are working full-time.
As can be seen from Table 1 below, expected costs of childcare are considerably
higher than average parents’ fees and amount to about 350 Euro per month for a full-
time slot for children of the younger age group. The diﬀerence between parents’ fees
and expected childcare costs is lowest for children aged 3 to 6, which is due to the low
level of rationing of subsidized childcare for this group of children.
Table 1: Average estimated parents’ fees for a subsidized slot and expected costs
of childcare
Children aged
0-2 years 3-6 years 7-10 years
Probability of being rationed with respect to center-based care 0.30 0.03 0.18
Parents’ fees for center-based care:
part-time 66 70 80
full-time 97 104 –
Expected costs of childcare:
part-time 198 80 136
full-time 357 134 –
Expected childcare subsidies:
part-time 264 357 289
full-time 540 739 –
Note: Euro per month.
Source: Own calculations on basis of SOEP, wave 2005.
In the empirical analysis, we will interpret the diﬀerence between the costs of pri-
vately organized childcare cm and the expected costs of childcare ec as subsidies within
the tax-transfer system. These “expected subsidies” es can thus be stated as
es = c
m − ec (2)
and are also reported in Table 1. It becomes evident from this Table that the
subsidies resulting from the in-kind provision of subsidized childcare are by far the
largest child-related transfer for the group of families with children under 10 years.
Note that we assume that mothers with children from three to six years use part-
time child care even if they are not working. This is in line with the empirical dis-
tribution of childcare utilization in Germany (see Wrohlich (2007a)). Mothers with
children younger than three years, however, are assumed to purchase childcare only if
7they are working. Thus, by deﬁnition, only those with children younger three who are
working receive in-kind subsidies. We use a similar argument for mothers with children
in primary school age, i.e 7-10 years. We assume that mothers only have to purchase
childcare in the afternoon if they are working full-time. The costs and beneﬁts of
schooling are not considered in this paper.
2.3 Work incentives for single mothers with children
Given the relatively generous out-of-work beneﬁts and the relatively high childcare costs
that result from the excess demand for subsidized childcare slots, the work incentives
for single mothers are relatively low. One way to summarize the structure of work
incentives is to visualize budget lines for an example household. Figure 1 shows net
household income of a single mother earning low wages (7.5 Euro per month, which
corresponds to the 25th percentile of the female wage distribution) with a 4-year old
child as a function of her working hours. The dark grey line on the top depicts net
income as a function of working hours. The budget line of this household is very ﬂat
over the whole distribution of working hours which is due to the high withdrawal rate
of the means tested transfers. If the mother increases working hours, net household
income increases only by a very small amount. This is even more striking if childcare
costs are taken into account. The light grey dotted line on the bottom depicts net
income less total costs of childcare. As has been explained above, we assume that the
mother with children between 3 and 6 years is purchasing part-time childcare even if she
is not working. If her working hours exceed 20 hours, we assume that she needs to buy
full-time care. This is the reason for the large kink in the budget line at the 21st hour.
However, parents don’t have to bear full childcare costs as has been explained above,
but only “expected costs of childcare”, i.e. parent’s fees that are highly subsidized if
they have access to such a slot, and full costs otherwise. Taking into account these
subsidies that are incorporated in the “expected childcare costs” leads to the dark
solid line in the middle. This line depicts the actual disposable income of a family.
The diﬀerence between this line and the dotted line at the bottom can be interpreted
as the amount of the childcare subsidies.
As can be seen from the Table above, expected childcare costs diﬀer considerably
between age groups of children because of diﬀerent amounts of subsidies. Thus, dispos-
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able income as a function of working hours looks diﬀerently for families with children in
diﬀerent age groups. Figure 2 summarizes budget constraints of a single mother with
an hourly wage of 7.5 Euro for children of three diﬀerent age groups. The uppermost
line depicts disposable income of a mother with a 1-year old child. Income for this fam-
ily type is highest because of the child-rearing beneﬁt that is granted on top of social
assistance and withdrawn only above a threshold of 16,500 Euro. However, this beneﬁt
is fully withdrawn once the mother’s working hours exceed 30 hours, making full-time
work for this group of individuals very unattractive. Note also that the budget line for
this household types shows a large kink at the ﬁrst working hour. The reason for this
is that we assume that mothers with children in this age group do not use childcare if
they are not working. Once they start to work, however, we assume that they need to
buy at least part-time childcare.
The light-grey dotted line depicts the budget line for single mothers with a 4-year
old child. In absolute terms, this household has a lower disposable income, however,
work incentives are markedly higher than for women with younger children. First, the
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child rearing beneﬁt is not granted any more, and second childcare costs are much
lower. The black line shows disposable income of a single mother with a child who is
8 years old. Since this child is attending school in the noon, we assume that childcare
costs only occur if the mother’s working time exceeds 20 hours. Since rationing of
subsidized childcare is much more present for this group of children than for children
aged 3 to 6, disposable income of mothers working more than 20 hours with children
in this age group is lower than for mothers with children aged 3 to 6.
2.4 Recent childcare policy reforms
In the past couple of years, the German federal government has been stressing the
importance of childcare opportunities, not least due to the declining fertility rates and
the low labor force participation of mothers. At the center of the debate are children
in the age group under three years. For children between three and six years, parents
have a legal claim for a part-time slot regardless of their working status since 1996.
For children below three years, however, availability of childcare slots is limited, as has
10been explained above. In 2005, the government passed a law that aims at increasing
the provision of childcare slots for children under three years. According to this law
(“Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz – TAG”), childcare slots have to be provided for all
children whose parents work or wish to work. The necessary additional number of
childcare slots will be provided by 2010. Thus, this reform proposal can in fact be seen
as transfer conditional on work similarly to the WFTC in the UK. However, in contrast
to the UK this transfer is a work conditioned in-kind beneﬁt. As a consequence of the
reform, childcare costs for households with children under three years are markedly
reduced if parents are working.
Figure 3 shows how disposable income changes for a single mother with a 1-year
old child. The light-grey dotted line at the top depicts net income without considering
childcare costs. The grey line at the bottom depicts the family’s disposable income
before the reform, while the black line shows disposable income after the reform. Be-
cause availability of childcare is increased, mothers who did not get a childcare slot
before the reform do not have to rely on the relatively expensive private childcare and
thus childcare costs are markedly reduced.
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11In section 4, we will simulate this “Tag”-Reform. In a second step, we will extend
the program also to children aged six to ten years. More speciﬁcally, we will assume
that afternoon-care for children in primary school age will be provided at the current
parents’ fees for all children whose mothers are working.
3 Methodology
In the following section we present the methodological framework for the analysis of
the optimality of the tax-transfer system including in-kind child related beneﬁts. As
stressed above the theoretical background for our analysis is the optimal tax model
which has been derived by Saez (2002). We follow Blundell et al. (2007) and use
microsimulation and microeconometric techniques to apply the theoretical model for
an empirical analysis of the optimal design of income taxation.
3.1 The Theoretical Model
The problem of optimal income taxation can be described as follows: a social planner,
e.g the government, maximizes a social welfare function given its budget constraint.
The social welfare function is a transformed function of individual utilities which them-
selves depend on net household income, or consumption, and leisure. In the framework
of optimal income taxation, the margin along which individuals can adjust their behav-
ior is their labor supply. This leads to the above mentioned controversy between equity
and eﬃciency. Whereas transfer programs, or negative tax payments, can increase the
disposable income of the disadvantaged, and thus increase their well-being, ﬁnancing
these programs with positive income tax rates introduces disincentives to work, and,
in general, will lead to a reduction in labor supply of the working population.
Saez (2002) sets up an optimal tax problem where there are I + 1 discrete groups
in the labor market: I groups of individuals who do work, plus one group consisting of
those who do not work. In the empirical analysis we distinguish the I+1 discrete groups
by gross earnings. Individuals choose whether or not to participate (the extensive
margin) and which group to choose (the intensive margin). In this framework, optimal












In this expression, Ti is net tax paid by group i and Ci is the net household income
of this group, so the term on the left-hand side is the extra tax paid when moving
from group i − 1 to i divided by the gain in net income. Non-workers receive beneﬁts
-T0, by deﬁnition identical to C0. The gross earnings of group i, equal to Ci + Ti,
are exogenously ﬁxed. hi measures the share of group i in the population. The social
welfare function is summarized by gi, the weight the government assigns to group i.







This mobility elasticity captures the percentage increase in supply of group i when
Ci-Ci−1 is increased by 1%, and is deﬁned under the assumption that individuals are
restricted to adjust their labor supply to the neighboring choice.
Finally, ηi is a measure of the extensive elasticity, and is deﬁned as the percentage of
individuals in group i who stop working when the diﬀerence between the net household







The main implication of the optimal tax rule above is that the optimal tax system
depends heavily on whether labor supply responses are concentrated at the intensive
or extensive margin. When the extensive elasticity is assumed to be zero, Saez’ model
gives results similar to Mirrlees’, where negative marginal tax rates are never optimal.
However, the greater is the extensive elasticity compared to the intensive elasticity,
the more likely it is that the optimal schedule will feature relative smaller guaranteed
income for non-workers, and negative marginal taxes at low levels of earnings.
6As discussed by Blundell et al., this is diﬀerent from the conventional extensive elasticity, or
elasticity of labor force participation, which is deﬁned as the proportional increase in workers when
net incomes rise by 1%.
133.2 Empirical Framework
The data base for the empirical analysis is the Socio Economic Panel (SOEP). The
SOEP is a representative sample of private households living in Germany with yearly
information on household incomes, hours worked and the household structure.7 The
data set includes detailed information about the socio-economic situation of more than
12,000 households that represent all private households living in Germany. For this
analysis, we draw on an unbalanced panel of single women for the ﬁscal years 1999 -
2004.8 We focus on women aged between 18 and 60 years, and exclude self-employed,
retired and women in full-time education. Overall, this results in 5801 observations.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Family Type
Share Employment Education Gross Wage Age
Without Children .57 .85 .31 17.89 40.50
Children >10 .24 .79 .18 16.54 44.47
Children 7 - 10 .06 .69 .21 15.13 37.89
Children <7 .11 .45 .13 12.91 33.44
All .80 .26 17.08 40.53
Note: Employment measures the share of women with positive work-
ing hours. Education is the share with highest school degree (Abitur,
Fachabitur). Gross Wage is the unconditional gross hourly wage in
Euro. For non-working women the wage is estimated accounting for
selectivity.
Source: Own calculations on basis of SOEP, wave 2000-2005.
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics for the whole population and for the key
sub groups of our analysis. Single women without children, with children in secondary
school age or older, i.e. older than 10 years, with children in primary school age, aged
7 - 10 years, and single women with children aged 6 years or younger. As discussed
above transfers diﬀer for children younger than 3. On the one hand, child rearing
beneﬁts for this group are very generous and only withdrawn at high incomes. Yet, on
the other hand, availability of public child care is very low for children in the youngest
age group leading to high child care costs. Therefore, it would be interesting to further
distinguish the group with children below three years. However, unfortunately the data
yield too few observations for working women with very young children to guarantee a
7A description of the SOEP can be downloaded from www.diw.de/soep; see also Haisken De-New
and Frick (2005).
8For the ﬁscal information we make use of the retrospective information. Thus, we use the waves
2000 - 2005.
14reliable and robust analysis.
Roughly 60% of all singles have no children, about 25% have children older than
10 years, about 7% are lone mothers with primary-school age children, and less than
10% have children younger than 7 years. The descriptive statistics show the expected
pattern: Employment rate is with over 85% highest for singles without children and
only slightly lower when children are at school age. However, less than 45% of lone
mothers with pre-school age children are employed. Furthermore, lone mothers with
young children have on average the lowest share of high education, and as a consequence
the lowest gross wages, and are on average about 10 years younger than the overall
population mean.
In order to apply the above speciﬁed optimal tax model to analyze the design of
the tax-transfer system in Germany, information about the tax and transfers, the gross
earnings, the behavioral parameters and the distribution of the population along the
discrete points is required. As stressed above, we deﬁne the I +1 discrete points along
the gross earnings distribution. This is the relevant information, since governments
mainly condition the tax schedule on gross earnings. We apply a microsimulation model
for Germany (STSM) to derive the tax and transfer payment and the resulting net
household income at each discrete point.9 The behavioral parameters, i.e. preferences
for income and leisure, that allow the calculation of the labor supply elasticities on the
extensive and the intensive margin, as deﬁned above, are estimated based on a static
structural labor supply model.
3.3 Labor Supply Estimation
In line with Blundell et al. (2007) we do not calibrate the labor supply elasticities
of various groups, but derive labor supply elasticities from a static structural discrete
choice model of labor supply, as e.g in van Soest (1995). This allows us to account for
heterogeneity of behavioral responses in the population which is crucial if we want to
assess the design of transfers for the subgroups deﬁned above, i.e. conditional on the
presence and age of children.
As we focus only on single households the framework for labor supply is relatively
9The microsimulation model STSM includes all relevant components of the German tax and transfer
system. For more detail, see (Steiner, Haan, and Wrohlich, 2005).
15straightforward. For this group we deﬁne 6 discrete working choices, inactivity, three
part time and two full time alternatives which describe the distribution of the working
behavior.10
At each discrete hours point j, the household i in period t receives utility Vijt which
is assumed to depend on a function U of the woman’s leisure Lfijt, her disposable
income Cijt and on observed and unobserved household characteristics, Zit and ai, and
on a random term ijt:
Vijt = U(Lfijt,Cijt,Zit,ai) + ijt. (6)
Following McFadden (1974) we assume that the error terms ijt follow an extreme
value distribution, and therefore the discrete choice model can be estimated by condi-
tional logit. The individual speciﬁc error term ai is speciﬁed nonparametrically follow-
ing Heckman and Singer (1984). We assume that ai is described by a bivariate discrete
distribution with two points of support (mass points) (a1,a2) which are constant for
all households.11 Each household has a probability πk, k ∈ {1,2} for each point of the














where ditj = 1 if j is the chosen alternative and 0 otherwise, and Pr(Yit = j) is
the choice probability for alternative j. For the speciﬁcation of the utility function, we
assume a utility function quadratic in income and leisure, similar to Blundell, Duncan,
McCrae, and Meghir (2000).
In the Appendix, we discuss the results of the estimation by providing information
about the behavioral reactions of households induced by changes in work incentives.
4 Optimal Welfare Function
Given the theoretical model of Saez and the empirical strategy we discuss the optimality
of the tax-transfer system for single mothers in Germany. Instead of deriving the
10The following hour classiﬁcation is used: [0,5], ]5,15], ]15,22], ]22,28], ]28,35], >35.
11More ﬂexible models with more points of support did either not aﬀect the results or did not
converge.
16optimal tax schedule given an assumed welfare function, as e.g in Blundell et al. (2007),
we follow Bourguignon and Spadaro (2005) and derive the welfare function which makes
the current tax and beneﬁt system for single women optimal.
At ﬁrst glance it might seem problematic to derive an optimal tax schedule for a
sub population, in our case single women. However, the government can positively
or negatively discriminate single households and explicitly targets transfers towards
singles with children.12 In other words, in this analysis we discuss the optimality of
income taxation for single women and take taxation of the rest of the population as
exogenous and constant.
As stressed above, we deﬁne the I + 1 discrete groups along the gross earnings
distribution, I groups for positive earnings, and in addition the group of non-workers
who have zero gross earnings. For this application we deﬁne 4 income classes along the
actual earnings distribution of the relevant group. As we assume that households adjust
their behavior along J discrete working points, it is necessary to translate the changes
in the working behavior to the I discrete earnings points. Given the individual wage
and the actual working behavior we assign each woman to the discrete income point
which has the minimum distance to her individual wage working hours combination.
We perform simulations for the whole population and separately for the above
deﬁned subpopulations, conditional on the presence and age of children. For the sim-
ulation of the subgroups we make a further ceteris paribus assumption, namely that
households in all other groups are not aﬀected and that their tax schedule remains
constant.
As mentioned above, childcare subsidies by the government form the most impor-
tant part of overall child related transfers. In our analysis we treat those subsidies in
the same way as general child beneﬁts and other beneﬁts for single households. In the
Appendix (Table 7) we provide simulations that do not take into account the income
generated by in-kind childcare facilities.
17Table 3: Optimal Welfare Function: Status Squo
Gross Earnings Net Income Net Tax Marginal Tax Int. Ela. Ext. Ela. Share Optimal Weight
All Households
-8 200 -208 0.24 1
201 290 -89 0.62 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.37
354 342 12 0.65 0.04 0.10 0.33 0.45
462 404 58 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.47
With Children younger 7 years
-70 298 -368 0.54 1
41 331 -290 0.76 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.39
115 348 -233 0.86 0.06 0.15 0.23 0.29
177 383 -206 0.61 0.06 0.36 0.12 0.17
With Children between 7 and 10 years
0 289 -289 0.31 1
157 343 -187 0.67 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.32
243 374 -131 0.76 0.06 0.17 0.34 0.33
347 425 -79 0.56 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.40
With Children older 10 years
0 245 -246 0.24 1
220 319 -99 0.67 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.21
371 381 -11 0.59 0.05 0.11 0.34 0.38
486 440 46 0.50 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.40
Without Children
0 151 -151 0.17 1
265 248 17 0.63 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.27
416 318 98 0.54 0.03 0.07 0.38 0.42
545 389 155 0.44 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.41
Notes: Discrete points are deﬁned along the group speciﬁc distribution of gross earnings. Earn-
ings, incomes and transfers are given in Euro per week. Int. Ela. and Ext. Ela. measure the
intensive and extensive elasticity as deﬁned in Saez (2002). The optimal weights are expressed
relative to the weight assigned to the group out of work.
Source: Own calculations on basis of SOEP, wave 2000-2005.
4.1 Optimality of the Tax and Beneﬁt System: The Current
System
In the ﬁrst panel of Table 3 we present the simulation results for the population of all
single women. As discussed above, we assume that lone mothers with children aged
between 3 and 6 years use child care even when not working. Therefore, on average
12The income tax legislation in Germany mainly discriminates between households with and without
children, and by marital status.
18gross earnings out of work are negative. The in-kind transfers which households receive
for child care are included in the net taxes. For the non-working women and the
women at the lowest earnings point net taxes are negative, thus they receive higher
transfers than the income taxes they pay. For the groups at higher earnings taxes
exceed transfers. This explains why the net incomes are more equally distributed over
the population than the gross earnings. Comparing the elasticities on the intensive and
the extensive margin, we ﬁnd that behavioral responses are stronger on the extensive
margin which suggests that in work credits might be optimal Saez (2002). The weights
that make the current tax and beneﬁt system optimal are shown in the last column.
For better interpretation we present the welfare weights normalized, relative to the
optimal weight for the single women that are non working. In line with Blundell et al.
(2007) our results show that the current tax and transfer system is only optimal when
the government assigns lower welfare weights to the working population than to the
non working population. We ﬁnd that on average, the optimal weight for the working
population are about 40% of the value for the non working population.
The picture slightly changes when focusing only on lone mothers with children
younger than 7 years and assuming taxation of all other groups to be constant. In
general, this is the group that receives the highest amount of transfers. On average
transfers are higher than income taxation at all earnings points. This is reﬂected in
the relatively even distribution of net household incomes. As mentioned above we
assume that childcare subsidies for children younger than three years are conditioned
on positive working hours of the mother. As can be seen from columns 5 and 6, the
diﬀerence between the intensive and the extensive elasticity is in particular strong for
the group of lone mothers with children younger 7 years and the diﬀerence is increasing
over the earnings points. This explains the pattern of the welfare function which makes
the current tax system optimal for this group. For the women working at the highest
earnings points, the welfare weights are very low, about 10%. In addition to the high
marginal tax rates even at the higher earnings points, this result is related to the
relatively high elasticity at the extensive margin which might justify in work credits
at this point, or at least higher transfers conditional on work. Thus, given the theory
of optimal taxation, the only way to rationalize the current tax system are the low
welfare weights the government assigns to this group.
19The simulated welfare function for lone mothers with older children hardly diﬀers
from the optimal weights for single women without children. Relative to the weight
assigned to the non working women, the welfare weights for the working women are
relatively low. In contrast to lone mother with very young children, the welfare weight
at the lowest earnings point is the lowest. At higher earnings points welfare weights
are slightly increasing. This is related to the high marginal tax rates at low earnings.
Most of the transfers are withdrawn at rates close to 100% and therefore marginal tax
rates are highest when starting to work.
Comparing the welfare function conditional on the presence and age of children we
ﬁnd two main results. Society values the welfare of non-working lone mothers with
pre-school age children relatively high and has a particular low value for women at
higher earnings points who are mainly full-time working women. If children are older,
society still has a high value for the non-working women but has stronger valuation
for women at the higher earnings points. Moreover, when comparing these results to
a simulation where in-kind childcare beneﬁts are not explicitly modelled as part of the
tax and transfer system, we ﬁnd an important diﬀerence. Without consideration of
in-kind beneﬁts, we ﬁnd that weights for working mothers with children under 7 years
are negative (see Appendix). This rather strange result vanishes if we explicitly include
in-kind childcare beneﬁts.
4.2 Optimality of the Tax and Beneﬁt System: Reforming
Childcare Subsidies
In the following, we derive the welfare weights that would justify a reform of the
childcare subsidies as discussed in section 2. This analysis is partly static, i.e. without
behavioral changes. We assume that the distribution of women at the deﬁned gross
earnings points is not aﬀected, yet we simulate the elasticities given the new incentives
of the childcare reform. For this analysis we focus only on the overall population and
the subgroups the reforms are targeted at, namely lone mothers with children younger
than school age and and for the second reform, mothers with children in primary school
age.
Table 4 yields the results of the TAG reform that is currently implemented. The
changes for the overall population are relatively moderate as only the group with
20Table 4: Optimal Welfare Function: Reform I
Gross Earnings Net Income Net Tax Marginal Tax Int. Ela. Ext. Ela. Optimal Weight
All Households
-8 200 -208 1.00
199 291 -92 0.56 0.17 0.17 0.39
352 343 8 0.66 0.04 0.10 0.46
459 406 54 0.42 0.03 0.12 0.48
With Children younger 7 years
-70 298 -367 1.00
33 337 -304 0.62 0.19 0.19 0.49
103 359 -255 0.69 0.06 0.15 0.45
161 398 -237 0.32 0.07 0.37 0.37
Note: see Table 3.
children younger than 7 are aﬀected. For this group, however, we ﬁnd marked changes.
First, the reform increases work incentives. On average, net household income increases
at all working points and the changes are increasing with gross earnings. The relative
increase at the highest earnings point amounts to about 4%. The stronger incentives
are reﬂected in the slightly increased labor supply elasticities, both on the extensive and
the intensive margin. Yet, as discussed above, even for the group of lone mothers with
young children behavioral responses to changes in income are moderate. In comparison
to the status quo scenario, the relative weights for working lone mothers increase. The
relative weight at the ﬁrst earnings point increases from 0.39 to 0.49. Changes become
even more relevant at higher earnings points where lone mothers make use of full time
child care. This is in particular true for the last point, where the weights increase from
0.17 to 0.37.
Thus, our ﬁndings indicate that the current reform of in-kind beneﬁts is only optimal
when the society shifts higher welfare weights to the working lone mothers relative to
those mother who do not work. Moreover, work at high earnings points which is mainly
full time work receives the highest relative increase in the welfare function. Given the
higher labor market participation rate of women and in particular mothers in several
neighboring countries, e.g. France, and the current normative discussion about the
compatibility of children and work, this shift in the welfare function seems plausible.
Table 5 shows the results for the second reform. This reform is in addition targeted
to the group of lone mothers with children at primary school. Again, the overall eﬀects
21Table 5: Optimal Welfare Function: Reform II
Gross Earnings Net Income Net Tax Marginal Tax Int. Ela. Ext. Ela. Optimal Weight
All Households
-7 199 -206 1.00
197 291 -94 0.55 0.17 0.17 0.41
349 344 5 0.66 0.04 0.10 0.47
457 406 50 0.42 0.02 0.12 0.49
With Children between 7 and 10 years
0 285 -285 1.00
153 343 -189 0.63 0.17 0.17 0.32
228 385 -157 0.43 0.07 0.16 0.46
328 440 -112 0.45 0.05 0.15 0.48
Note: see Table 3.
are moderate, as the major share of single mothers is not aﬀected by this reform. The
more generous in-kind transfers for this sub group increase the work incentives as the
net household income increases with gross earnings. This is only true for full time
work, as part time child care is not aﬀected by the reform. As discussed above, we do
not account for neither costs nor subsidies for schooling. Therefore, we ﬁnd most of
the changes for this group at the higher earnings points, where women tend to work
full time. For the households with children at primary school we ﬁnd the expected
pattern: Since part time working women do not beneﬁt from the second reform the
relative weight at the ﬁrst earnings point remains relatively low with 32%. At the higher
points however the relative weights are increasing due to the reform when comparing
the weights to the status quo regime. The relative valuation for this group at higher
working points increases from 40% to nearly 50%. Thus, again these results imply
that a reform of the in-kind transfers for the group of lone mothers with primary aged
school children, is only optimal if the society shifts higher relative welfare values to the
working mothers.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on optimal taxation. We combine a
theoretical model of optimal taxation with microsimulation and behavioral econometric
model to analyze the optimal design of the tax and transfer system of single women in
22Germany. Two empirical observations motivate our analysis. First, the diﬀerent design
of transfer programs conditional on the presence and age of children and, second,
current political reforms which aim at increasing the in-kind beneﬁts for child care
conditional on employment.
Our empirical results suggest that in general, German society has a relatively strong
taste of redistribution towards non-working single women. The welfare weights for non
working women are clearly higher than for the working, and this results holds regardless
of the presence and age of children. The interesting diﬀerence conditional on children
is that society seems to value part-time work of lone mothers with children younger
than school age relatively higher than full-time work, whereas for women with older
or without children, the opposite is true. For these groups full time work is valued
stronger. We further ﬁnd that a reform of in-kind childcare subsidies conditioned
on employment markedly changes the welfare function of the society for the targeted
groups. The “TAG” reform which is currently implemented in Germany with the aim
to provide subsidized childcare slots for all children under three years with working par-
ents, is only optimal from a welfare perspective if society increases welfare weights for
full-time work, or more precisely work at higher earnings point. The second hypothet-
ical reform, suggesting to extend child care facilities for part-time care of school-aged
children leads to a similar result. This reform is only optimal if society increases the
relative welfare weights for the working lone mothers and thus slightly shifting from
the valuation of equity to eﬃciency.
However, even under the two reforms that allocate more subsidies towards working
single mothers, the tax-transfer system is only optimal if the weights for non-working
mothers are higher than for working mothers. Thus, we ﬁnd that the system with
higher work-conditioned in-kind transfers is only optimal if society still has a strong
taste for equity, or a relative high welfare weight for the non-working single mothers.
References
Aarberge, R., and U. Columbino (2005): “Designing Optimal Taxes With a
Microeconometric Model of Household Labour Supply,” IZA-Working-Paper, 2468.
23Blundell, R., M. Brewer, P. Haan, and A. Shephard (2007): “Optimal income
taxation of lone mothers: an empirical comparison for Britain and Germany,” mimeo.
Blundell, R., A. Duncan, J. McCrae, and C. Meghir (2000): “The Labour
Market Impact of the Working Families‘ Tax Credit,” Fiscal Studies, 21(1), 75–104.
Bourguignon, F., and A. Spadaro (2005): “Tax-Beneﬁts Revealed Social Prefer-
ences,” PSE Working Paper, 22.
Haisken De-New, J., and J. Frick (2005): Desktop Compendium to The German
Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). DIW, Berlin.
Heckman, J., and B. Singer (1984): “A Method for Minimizing the Distributional
Assumptions in Econometric Models for Duration Data,” Econometrica, 52, 271–320.
Immervoll, H., and D. Barber (2005): “Can Parents aﬀord to Work? Childcare
Costs, Tax-Beneﬁt Policies and Work Incentives,” OECD Social, Employment and
Migration Working Papers, 31.
Immervoll, H., H. Kleven, C. Kreiner, and E. Saez (2007): “Welfare Reform in
European Countries: A Micro-Simulation Analysis,” Economic Journal, 117, 1–44.
McFadden, D. (1974): “Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior,”
in Frontiers in Econometrics, ed. by P. Zarembka. Academic Press, New York.
Mirrlees, J. (1971): “An exploration in the Theory of optimal income taxation,”
Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175–208.
Saez, E. (2002): “Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus extensive
labor supply responses,” Quaterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1039–1073.
Spiess, C. K., and K. Wrohlich (2008): “Parental Leave Reform in Germany:
Costs and Labour Market Outcomes of Moving Towards the Nordic Model,” Popu-
lation Research and Policy Review, forthcoming.
Steiner, V., P. Haan, and K. Wrohlich (2005): “Dokumentation des Steuer-
Transfer-Mikrosimulationsmodells 1999-2002,” DIW Data Documentation 9.
24van Soest, A. (1995): “Structural Models of Family Labor Supply: A Discrete Choice
Approach,” Journal of Human Resources, 30, 63–88.
Wrohlich, K. (2007a): “Evaluating Family Policy Reforms Using Behavioral Mi-
crosimulation. The example of childcare and income tax reforms in Germany,” Doc-
toral Thesis, Free University of Berlin, published on-line under http://www.diss.fu-
berlin.de/2007/531.




Instead of interpreting the coeﬃcients estimated in the discrete choice model, we an-
alyze the labor supply behavior by calculating labor supply reactions given a change
in gross wages. The labor supply reactions are derived numerically based on the es-
timated preferences of the labor supply model. The gross-wage elasticities presented
here can be interpreted as a general measure to understand how individuals react to
changes in work incentives. Note, that these eﬀects diﬀer from those deﬁned by Saez
which will be derived in the following section, as the changes in work incentives diﬀer.
The following table summarizes labor supply elasticities with respect to changes in
labor market participation and with respect to working hours. In general, the labor
supply responses of single women are very moderate. Only lone mothers with pre-school
age children strongly react to changes in work incentives. The average elasticities with
respect to participation is about 2 times larger than the overall population mean and
the elasticity with respect to working hours even 3 times.
Table 6: Gross Wage Elasticities by Family Type
Participation Elasticity Working Hour Elasticity
Without Children 0.06 0.06
Children >10 0.09 0.09
Children 7 - 10 0.08 0.16
Children <7 0.15 0.24
All 0.07 0.08
Note: Elasticities are the relative change in Participation and
Working Hours given a 1% increase in gross hourly wages.
Source: Own calculations on basis of SOEP, wave 2000-2005.
26Table 7: Optimal Welfare Function - Without Child Care Subisdies
Gross Earnings Net Income Net Tax Marginal Tax Int. Ela. Ext. Ela. Share Optimal Weight
All Households
0 200 -200 0.24 1
234 290 -56 0.62 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.30
383 342 41 0.65 0.04 0.10 0.33 0.42
496 404 92 0.45 0.03 0.12 0.21 0.44
With Children younger 7 years
0 298 -298 0.54 1
136 331 -195 0.76 0.17 0.17 0.11 0.40
265 348 -83 0.86 0.06 0.15 0.23 0.01
355 383 -28 0.61 0.06 0.36 0.12 -0.15
With Children between 7 and 10 years
0 289 -289 0.31 1
167 343 -176 0.67 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.35
295 374 -79 0.76 0.06 0.17 0.34 0.20
411 425 -15 0.56 0.05 0.14 0.19 0.32
With Children older 10 years
0 245 -245 0.24 1
224 319 -95 0.67 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.20
375 381 -7 0.59 0.05 0.11 0.34 0.37
490 440 51 0.50 0.02 0.12 0.22 0.39
Without Children
0 151 -151 0.17 1
265 248 17 0.63 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.27
416 318 98 0.54 0.03 0.07 0.38 0.43
545 389 155 0.44 0.03 0.10 0.22 0.41
Note: see Table 3.
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